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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-FALSE IMPRISONMENT-
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-COURT REQUIRES CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE TO 
SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BOTH 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
ACTIONS; FALSE IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT LIE 
AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WRONGFULLY 
PROCURES THE ARREST OF ANOTHER, WHERE ARREST 
IS MADE BY A POLICE OFFICER EXECUTING A FACIALLY 
VALID WARRANT. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 
664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early to mid 1970s, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
rendered several decisions that changed the standards for the allow-
ability of punitive damages in tort actions.) In recent years, however, 
the court has attempted to restrict the availability of punitive dam-
ages to plaintiffs2 by returning to previous standards that the Mary-
land courts had followed for over a century.3 Historically in Mary-
land, punitive damages, for any tort, were only recoverable with 
evidence of actual malice on behalf of the defendant.4 The sole ex-
ception to this rule was the tort of malicious prosecution.s In mali-
1. See infra notes 110-20 for a discussion of Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 
Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled Uy Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 
Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992), and its progeny. In Smith, the court of appeals, 
relying on out-of-state authority, for the first time in a non-intentional tort ac-
tion, allowed an award of punitive damages based upon implied malice. Smith, 
267 Md. at 160-68, 297 A.2d at 729-32. 
2. See infra note 235 and accompanying text for discussion of recent court of ap-
peals decisions limiting the availability of punitive damages. 
3. See, e.g., Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944); Heinze v. 
Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 429, 24 A.2d 917, 920-21 (1942); Knickerbocker Co. v. 
Gardiner Co., 107 Md. 556, 568-69, 69 A. 405, 410 (1908); Baltimore and Ohio 
R.R. Co. v. Boyd, 63 Md. 325 (1885). 
4. See supra note 3 for cases holding actual malice is required to support an 
award for punitive damages. 
5. See infra notes 127-38 for discussion of pup.itive damages in malicious prosecu-
tion actions in Maryland. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 
Md. 228, 248, 389 A.2d 359, 370 (1978) (Levine, j., dissenting) (describing the 
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cious prosecution cases, courts have traditionally allowed an implied 
malice'standard to support an award of punitive damages.6 
With its deCision in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,? however, the 
court of appeals changed this common-law principle with respect to 
the standard of malice required to support an award of punitive 
damages in a malicious prosecution action.s Moreover, the court re-
affirmed the actual malice standard required to support an award of 
punitive damages in false imprisonment actions.9 
In addition to the issue of punitive damages, Wilson presented 
the court with an issue of first impression in Maryland: whether an 
individual who wrongfully procures another's arrest is liable for false 
imprisonment, where there was no detention prior to the arrest, 
and the arrest is made by a police officer pursuant toa facially valid 
arrest warrant. lO In holding there is no liability in such a situation,!1 
the court has provided a substantial amount of insulation from lia-
bility to one who is attempting to effectuate an arrest of another 
through the formal requirements established by law. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. Malicious Prosecution 
Although not favored by the law,12 malicious prosecution is a vi-
able cause of action in Maryland. 13 In an action for malicious prose-
cution of a criminal charge in Maryland, the plaintiff must prove 
tort of malicious prosecution "as an anomaly in the law of damages" with re-
spect to the standard of implied malice to support an award of punitive dam-
ages). 
6. See infra notes 127-38 for discussion of punitive damages in malicious prosecu-
tion actions in Maryland. 
7. 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
8. See iii. at 735-36, 664 A.2d at 933. 
9. See id. at 732, 664 A.2d at 931. Maryland courts had apparently, for some time, 
abandoned the actual malice standard in favor of an implied malice standard 
as a result of "unfortunate" dicta, id., from the 1972 case, Montgomery Ward & 
Co. v. CLiser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972). 
10. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 726, 664 A.2d at 928. 
11. See id. at 726-27, 664 A.2d at 928. 
12. See Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688, 284 A.2d 241, 242 (1971). Actions for 
malicious prosecution are generally not favored in the law because public pol-
icy encourages that criminals be brought to justice and citizens be allowed to 
aid the prosecution without fear of civil suits for damages. See, e.g., Whittaker 
v. Duke, 473 F. Supp. 908, 912 (S.D.N.Y 1979); Devlin v. Greiner, 371 A.2d 380, 
393 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). 
13. See, e.g., Durante, 263 Md. at 688, 284 A.2d at 242. 
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the following elements set forth in Exxon Corp. v. Kelly:14 
(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the 
defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the pro-
ceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable 
cause for the proceeding, and (d) "malice", or a primary 
purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of 
bringing an offender to justice.15 
585 
1. Criminal Proceeding Instituted or Continued by the Defendant 
A criminal proceeding includes any proceeding where the gov-
ernment prosecutes an individual for either a common-law or statu-
tory offense and seeks to impose a criminal penalty.16 Generally, 
there must be some affirmative action taken by the defendant in 
the civil action to bring about a prosecution, such as preparing an 
application for a statement of charges against the accused or re-
questing that the person be prosecuted. I7 However, the institution 
of criminal proceedings does not occur until formal action is taken 
by an official. I8 A person may also incur liability for malicious prose-
cution by continuing criminal proceedings against an individual, 
whether initiated by himself or another. 19 
14. 281 Md. 689, 381 A2d 1146 (1978). 
15. Id. at 693, 381 A2d at 1149 (quoting Durante, 263 Md. at 688, 284 A.2d at 
243.) 
16. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 654 cmt. a (1977). This term includes 
proceedings where the individual is prosecuted for petty offenses such as park-
ing violations. See id. The importance of the crime is not material, except that 
it may effect the damages the accused is entitled to recover in a malicious 
prosecution action. See id. 
17. Alan R. Gilbert, Annotation, Malicious Prosecution: Liability for Instigation or Con-
tinuation of Prosecution of Plaintiff Mistakenly Identified as Person Who Committed an 
Offense, 66 AL.R.3d 10, 15 (1975) (and cases cited therein). But see Banks v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 787 P.2d 953 (Wash. App. 1990) (holding that tortious con-
duct may arise from a failure to act when there is a duty to act affirmatively). 
18. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 654 cmt. d (1977). 
19. See id. § 655. For example, in Purvis v. Hamwi, 828 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Colo. 
1993), the plaintiff, Purvis, spent nine years in prison for the murder and sex-
ual assault of a mother and the murder of her daughter, until the true killer 
confessed that he was hired by the victim's husband to commit the murders. 
See id. at 1480-81. Upon his release, Purvis filed a malicious prosecution action 
against Hamwi. See id. at 1481. The husband, who had not instituted the crimi-
nal proceedings against Purvis but who had participated in the investigation 
of the murders and had testified as a witness for the state, filed a motion to 
dismiss the malicious prosecution action. See id. at 1481. In denying the hus-
band's motion to dismiss, the court stated that there was a duty not to actively 
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In Nance v. Gall,20 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed 
the issue of what constitutes the institution of a criminal prc;>ceed-
ing.21 An employee of Gall, while in the process of cutting down 
trees for Gall's sawmill and logging business, inadvertently knocked 
down a telephone pole located adjacent to a railroad track.22 Nance, 
employed by the Maryland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
met with a magistrate to express his concern about trees obstructing 
the railroad tracks. 23 Led to believe from his conversation with 
Nance that Gall was continuing to cut trees near the track, a magis-
trate issued a warrant for Gall's arrest for violating a statute prohib-
iting the placement of trees on railroad tracks.24 In fact, it was dis-
covered from testimony given at a preliminary hearing that Gall had 
immediately stopped the cutting of all trees close to the railroad 
tracks after learning that the telephone pole was knocked down.25 
The charges against Gall were dismissed, and he subsequently filed 
a malicious prosecution action against Nance and the Maryland and 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company.26 Although Nance himself did not 
swear out a warrant for Gall's arrest, the court concluded that he 
"aided and abetted" in the institution of the prosecution and would 
assist in the prosecution of an innocent man and a duty not to lie under oath. 
See id. at 1485. 
20. 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120 (1946), modified on other grounds, 187 Md. 674, 51 
A.2d 535 (1947). The modification of this case did not alter the court's ruling 
concerning what constitutes the institution of a criminal proceeding. At trial, 
Nance and a corporate defendant were found jointly liable for malicious pros-
ecution and the jury awarded punitive damages to the plaintiff. See id. at 659, 
50 A.2d at 121. On appeal, however, Nance was held solely liable for the insti-
tution of malicious prosecution while the jury's finding of corporate liability 
was reversed. See id. at 674, 50 A.2d at 128. Nance filed a motion for modifica-
tion of the opinion, arguing that the jury's punitive award for joint liability 
was being imposed solely on him. See Nance, 187 Md. at 674, 51 A.2d at 535. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with this claim, stating, «[w]e do 
not think that a judgment rendered against two defendants should be im-
posed alone upon one of those defendants." [d. at 677, 51 A.2d at 536. The 
court noted that to do this would undermine Nance's right under the Joint 
Tortfeasor Act to force the co-defendant railroad to pay one half of the judg-
ment. See id. Thus, Nance's motion for modification was granted, and he was 
awarded a new trial. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 660-61, 50 A.2d at 121-22. 
23. See id. at 664, 50 A.2d at 123. 
24. See id. at 664-65, 50 A.2d at 124. 
25. See id. at 666, 50 A.2d at 124. 
26. See id. at 669, 50 A.2d at 126. 
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be liable if the other elements of a malicious prosecution action 
were established.27 
2. Termination of the Proceeding in Favor of the Accused 
In order to incur liability for malicious prosecution, the crimi-
nal proceedings must have terminated in favor of the accused.28 A 
termination in favor of the accused ordinarily occurs when the final 
disposition of the criminal case indicates the innocence of the ac-
cused.29 Although clearly a not guilty verdict is considered a termi-
nation in favor of the accused, and a guilty verdict is not, there are 
other dispositions of criminal cases that are not so clear. For exam-
ple, in Haefner v. Burkey,30 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held 
that the quashing of an indictment and the entry of nolle prosequil1 
satisfied the requisite element of prior favorable termination.32 
Whether an entry of nolle prosequi is evidence of a lack of probable 
cause for the initiation of criminal proceedings depends upon the 
circumstances of each case.33 In Rubin v. Nowak,34 an administrative 
dismissal was held to be a favorable termination of a criminal pro-
ceeding for purposes of a malicious prosecution action.35 
27. See id. 
28. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
29. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 660 cmt. a (1977). However, if the 
criminal proceedings are adversely terminated, subsequent proof that the ac-
cused is innocent will not support an action for malicious prosecution, even if 
it is shown that the conviction was unjust or obtained by fraud or perjury. See 
id. § 658 cmt. c. But see Purvis v. Hamwi, 828 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Colo. 1993) 
(sustaining malicious prosecution action where the accused was exonerated 
nine years after a murder conviction, where the conviction was obtained 
through fraud and perjury). 
30. 626 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1993). 
31. Noll£ prosequi is defined as "[t]he voluntary withdrawal by the prosecuting at-
torney of present proceedings on a criminal charge." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 
1048 (6th ed. 1990). 
32. See Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521. In Haefner, the criminal trial resulted in a mis-
trial, and the appellate court quashed the state's attempt to try him -again. See 
id. at 520. The state then noll£ prossed the remaining charges based on insuffi-
cient evidence. See id. 
33. See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 695, 381 A.2d 1146, 1150 (1978). See 
also infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text for discussion of probable cause. 
34. 590 A.2d 249 (NJ. Super. 1991). 
35. See id. at 251. Rubin involved criminal complaints filed by one business partner 
against another because of disagreements arising out of the dissolution of 
their partnership. See id. at 250. The criminal complaints were administratively 
dismissed by the county prosecutor without presentation to the grand jury. See 
id. 
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On the other hand, the stet36 of a criminal charge is not con-
sidered a disposition of the criminal case in favor of the accused.37 
Presumably, this is because when a criminal case is "stetted," the 
defendant "remains liable to be proceeded against under the same 
indictment," if the prosecuting attorney wishes to remove the case 
from the stet docket.38 In addition, a plea for nolo contendcnf9 by the 
criminal defendant does not qualify as a termination in favor of the 
accused.40 
3. Absence of Probable Cause for the Proceeding 
In Exxon Corp. v. Kelly,41 the Court of Appeals of Maryland de-
fined probable cause as "a reasonable ground of suspicion sup-
ported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant 
a cautious man in believing that the accused is guilty. "42 Probable 
36. Stet frrocessus is defined as "[a]n entry on the roll in the nature of a judgment 
of a direction that all further proceedings shall be stayed." BlACK'S LAw DIC-
TIONARY 1414 (6th ed. 1990). In Maryland, "[t]he stet ... is simply an indica-
tion by the prosecutor, acquiesced in by the court, that he does not choose at 
that time on that indictment to proceed further with the prosecution." State v. 
Jones, 18 Md. App. 11, 34, 305 A.2d 177, 190 (1973) (citations omitted). 
37. See RICHARD J. GILBERT & PAUL T. GILBERT, MARYlAND TORT LAw HANDBOOK 
§ 4.7, at 45 (2d ed. 1992). 
38. See, e.g., Jones, 18 Md. App. at 33, 305 A.2d at 190. 
39. Nolo contendere means "I will not contest it"; a plea in a criminal case which 
has a similar legal effect as pleading guilty. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1048 (6th 
ed. 1990). "The principal difference between a plea of guilty and a plea of 
nolo contendere is that the latter may not be used against the defendant in a 
civil action based upon the same acts." [d. 
40. See Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1993). In Pete, the plaintiff sued the 
Texas Department of Corrections and others involved in his arrest and prose-
cution for charges of sexual assault. See id. at 214-16. In holding that the plain-
tiff was barred from pursuing an action for malicious prosecution, the court 
determined that the criminal prosecution resulted in a conviction with the 
enter of a plea of nolo contendere, and not a termination in favor of the ac-
cused. See id. at 219. 
41. 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978). 
42. [d. at 697, 381 A.2d at 1151 (quoting Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 
Md. 31, 39, 128 A.2d 600, 604 (1957». Section 662 of the REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS expresses the rule as to whether probable cause exists: 
One who initiates or continues criminal proceedings against another 
has probable cause for doing so if he correctly or reasonably believes 
(a) that the person whom he accuses has acted or failed to act in a 
particular manner, and (b) that those acts or omissions constitute 
the offense that he charges against the accused, and (c) that he is 
sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts to justify him in initi-
ating or continuing the prosecution. 
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cause is measured by the circumstances as they reasonably appeared 
to the defendant at the time he initiated the proceedings.43 The 
mere suspicion or belief that the accused has committed the offense 
is not sufficient to constitute probable cause.44 
During the course of a criminal proceeding, certain events may 
have an evidentiary effect on whether probable cause exists. The 
dismissal of criminal charges against the accused at a preliminary 
hearing by a magistrate45 is prima jacitf6 evidence of a lack of proba-
ble cause, because it is the function of a magistrate to determine 
the sufficiency of the evidence against the accused to justify prose-
cution of the case.47 A nolle prosequi may be evidence of lack of prob-
able cause, depending on the circumstances of its entry.48 In discuss-
ing the effect of a nolle prosequi on a subsequent malicious prosecu-
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 662 (1977). 
43. See Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 451, 298 A.2d 156, 165 (1972). 
44. See Pessagno v. Keyes, 143 Md. 437, 442, 122 A. 651, 653 (1923) (citing Johns v. 
Marsh, 52 Md. 323 (1879)). 
45. According to comment c of section 659 of the Restatement, "[t]he term 'mag-
istrate' is used to include not only a person who bears that title but also any 
other person who, like a magistrate, has the power to bind over for further 
hearing." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 659 cmt. c (1977). 
46. "At first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be 
judged from the first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed to be true un-
less disproved by some evidence to the contrary." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 
1189 (6th ed. 1990). 
47. See Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31, 40, 128 A.2d 600, 605 
(1957). However, the defendant may rebut the inference of lack of probable 
cause. See id. Other cases in Maryland have discussed the consequences of a 
dismissal of the criminal charges by a magistrate. In Straus v. Young, 36 Md. 
246 (1872), the court of appeals stated that the discharge of the charges by a 
magistrate is " [pJrima facie evidence of the want of probable cause, sufficient 
to throw upon the defendant the burden of proving the contrary." Id. at 255. 
In Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120 (1946), modified on other grounds, 187 
Md. 674, 51 A.2d 535 (1947), the court explained the consequence as follows: 
[The] result of the hearing before the magistrate establishes the fal-
sity of the charge, and supports an inference that the prosecution 
was motivated by malice and want of probable cause. This inference 
could have been rebutted by proof that facts and circumstances, suffi-
ciently strong in themselves, were known to defendants . . . such as 
to induce a cautious and careful man to believe [the plaintiff] guilty 
of [the] charge .... 
Id. at 669, 50 A.2d at 126. The court in Norvell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Md. 
14, 128 A.2d 591 (1957), explained that" [d]ischarge by a magistrate on [a] 
preliminary hearing may furnish some evidence of a want of probable cause, 
whereas acquittal after trial does not." Id. at 20-21, 128 A.2d at 594. 
48. See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 695, 381 A.2d 1146, 1150 (1978). 
590 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
tion action, the Exxon court stated that "in order to be evidence of 
want of prob~ble cause, the public prosecutor's dismissal must be 
'at the instance of the private prosecutor or conditioned upon his 
consent.' "49 
In Gladding Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fowler,5o the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland stated, in dicta, that a grand jury indictment is "fpJrima fa-
cie evidence of probable cause. "51 The court favorably cited the Re-
statement view, noting that it reflected the majority rule.52 In addi-
tion, the Gladding court held that there is no liability for malicious 
prosecution when the defendant fully discloses the facts to his coun-
sel and acts upon the advice of counsel to initiate criminal proceed-
ings against the accused. 53 
The conviction of the criminal defendant at trial, although 
later reversed by an appellate court, conclusively establishes the ex-
istence of probable cause.54 The verdict of the trier of fact, ex-
pressed in terms of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is regarded as 
conclusive evidence that the person who initiated the criminal pro-
49. Id. at 697, 381 A.2d at 1151 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 665(2) cmt. b (1977». In reversing the court of special appeals, the Exxon 
court emphasized that "mere knowledge and consent" of the private prosecu-
tor in the public prosecutor's dismissal of the charges will not be sufficient to 
constitute evidence of lack of probable cause. Id. 
50. 264 Md. 499, 287 A.2d 280 (1972). 
51. Id. at 508, 287 A.2d at 285. 
52. See id. Section 664(2) of the Restatement states that "[t]he indictment of the 
accused by a grand jury ... is evidence that the person who initiated the pro-
ceedings had probable cause for" initiating them. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 664(2) (1977). 
53. See Gladding Chevrolet, 264 Md. at 509-10, 287 A.2d at 286. 
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 667(1) (1977). In Roundtree v. City of 
New Yom, 778 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y 1991), the accused sued the city and its 
police department, alleging a violation of his civil rights by arresting him for 
possession of cocaine without probable cause. See id. at 616-17. In dismissing 
the malicious prosecution claim, the court held that the plaintiff's guilty plea 
to a lesser charge of disorderly conduct and his failure to claim that his con-
viction was obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means were a com-
plete defense to his claim of arrest without probable cause. See id. at 619-20. 
The same result was reached in Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 852 P.2d 295 
(Wash. 1993). In Hanson, a criminal defendant was convicted of first degree 
assault. See id. at 296. When the conviction was overturned on appeal, the 
criminal defendant sued the city for various torts, including malicious prose-
cution. See id. at 296-97. In reinstating the trial court's dismissal of the mali-
cious prosecution claim, the court held that a conviction, even if reversed, 
conclusively established the existence of probable cause as a defense to a mali-
cious prosecution claim. See id. at 297. 
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ceedings had reasonable grounds to do SO.55 However, this rule does 
not apply if it is .shown that the conviction was obtained by fraud, 
peIjury, or other corrupt means.56 An acquittal, on the other hand, 
is not evidence of a lack of probable cause.57 An acquittal merely 
shows that the prosecution was not able to meet its burden of prov-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, an acquittal is 
considered immaterial in determining the existence of probable 
cause.58 
Whether the absence of probable cause is a question of fact for 
the jury or a question of law for the court depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each case. In Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood,59 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland thoroughly analyzed the respective functions 
of the judge and jury in determining whether a lack of probable 
cause exists in a malicious prosecution case.60 Noting that there 
were two contradictory lines of cases on this issue in Maryland, the 
court attempted to resolve the conflict.61 One line of cases holds 
that it is the judge's function to determine whether the facts, as 
found by the jury, constitute a want of probable cause.62 The other 
family of cases asserts that the jury ultimately determines whether or 
not the facts constitute probable cause.63 In holding that this is a 
question of law for the judge, the court followed the language in 
Boyd v. Cross,64 an early decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland: 
The want of probable cause is a mixed question of law and 
fact. As to the existence of the facts relied on to constitute 
the want of probable cause, that is a question for the jury; 
55. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 667(1) cmt. b (1977). 
56. See id. § 667(1). This exception was evidenced in'Purois v. Hamwi, 828 F. Supp. 
1479 (D. Colo. 1993), where the accused, who was exonerated after serving 
nine years for a double murder conviction, was allowed to maintain an action 
for malicious prosecution, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 1485. While the plaintiff was 
serving out his sentence in prison, the killer who was hired by the husband of 
the murdered wife and child, confessed to the crime. See id. at 1480-81. See 
supra note 19 for a discussion of Purois. 
57. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 667(2) (1977). 
58. See id. § 667 cmt. d. 
59. 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984). 
60. See id. at 497-501, 471 A.2d at 304-05. 
61. See id. at 486, 471 A.2d at 298. 
62. See id. 
63. See id . 
. 64. 35 Md. 194 (1872). 
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but what will amount to the want of probable cause in any 
case, is a question of law for the court. The jury, in our 
practice, are always instructed hypothetically as to what con-
stitutes probable cause, or the want of it, leaving to them to 
find the facts embraced in the hypothesis.65 
4. Malice: A Primary Purpose in Instituting the Proceeding Other 
than Bringing an Offender to Justice 
In Maryland, the "malice element" of malicious prosecution 
consists of a wrongful or improper motive in initiating or continu-
ing criminal proceedings against the accused.66 It is not necessary to 
show evidence of spite, hatred, or revenge to establish malice in the 
context of malicious prosecution.67 Any purpose other than bringing 
an offender to justice, if primarily the cause for initiating the pro-
ceeding, is an improper purpose and thus constitutes malice.68 
Unlike probable cause, the question of whether the accuser ac-
ted with malice, or some purpose other than bringing an offender 
to justice, presents a question for the jury.69 Moreover, malice can 
be inferred from a lack of probable cause in instituting the criminal 
proceeding.70 In discussing both the elements of probable cause 
and malice, Maryland's highest court in Owens v. Graetzepl stated, 
"of these two indispensable elements the want of probable cause is 
the more important, because if it be established by the proof, mal-
65. Palmer Ford, 298 Md. at 501, 471 A.2d at 306 (quoting Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 
194, 197 (1872». 
66. See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281. Md. 681, 689, 381 A.2d 1146, 1153 (1978); Du-
rante v. Braun, 263 Md. 688, 691, 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971); Banks v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31,42, 128 A.2d 600, 606 (1957); Torsch v. Dell, 
88 Md. 459, 468, 41 A. 903, 906 (1898). 
67. See Johns v. Marsh, 52 Md. 323, 332-33 (1879) (" 'the term 'malice,' in this 
form of action, is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against 
an individual, but of malus animus, and as denoting that the party is actuated 
by improper and indirect motives'" (citation omitted»; see also Keys v. 
Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397,408 n.7, 494 A.2d 200, 205 n.7 (1985) (cit~ 
ing Exxon Corp., 281 Md. at 700, 381 A.2d at 1153; Johns, 52 Md. at 332-33) 
(stating that "[m]alice in this context means that the party was actuated by an 
improper motive, and proof of malice does not require evidence of spite, ha-
tred, personal enmity or a desire for revenge"). 
68. See Johns, 52 Md. at 332. 
69. See Exxon Corp., 281 Md. at 699, 381 A.2d at 1152-53 (citing Jannenga v. 
Libemini, 222 Md. 469, 474, 160 A.2d 795, 798 (1960); Banks, 212 Md. at 42, 
128 A.2d at 606. 
70. See Exxon Corp., 281 Md. at 699-700, 381 A.2d at 1153. 
71. 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265 (1926). 
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ice may be inferred."72 Of course, the inference of malice from a 
finding of a lack of probable cause may be negated by evidence 
showing there was no actual malice on the part of the defendant.73 
Although malice may be inferred from a lack of probable 
cause, the converse is not true-a lack of probable cause cannot be 
inferred from malice.74 Thus, evidence that probable cause existed 
is a valid defense to a malicious prosecution action, even if the ac-
cuser initiated the. proceeding for an improper purpose and the 
proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused.75 
B. False Imprisonment 
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Pau~ 76 the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland set forth the elements of a false imprisonment action 
as follows: "The necessary elements of a case for false imprisonment 
are a deprivation of the liberty of another without his consent and 
without legal justification."77 The term "legal justification" has cre-
ated some confusion in its application to false imprisonment "be-
cause of the frequent statement that probable cause is not a de-
fense to an action for false imprisonment but legal justification is. "78 
In Maryland, the term "legal justification" is considered to be 
72. [d. at 696, 132 A. at 267. 
73. Exxon, 281 Md. at 699, 381 A.2d at 1152 (quoting Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 
Md. 192, 197-98,321 A.2d 529, 532-33 (1974» ("The inference is merely a per-
missible one, 'sometimes loosely characterized as prima facie evidence, subject 
to negation by proof that there was no actual malice on the defendant's 
part.' "). 
74. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 175, 122 A.2d 457,461 (1956). A 
lack of probable cause may give rise to an inference that the accuser did not 
believe in the guilt of the accused, and therefore did not act for a proper pur-
pose. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 669 (1977). However, the initia-
tion of a criminal proceeding for an improper purpose, "such as to put pres-
sure upon the accused and compel him to make payment of a private debt, is 
not in any way inconsistent with his reasonable belief in the guilt of the ac-
cused and the existence of grounds reasonably justifying that belief." [d. 
§ 669A cmt. b. 
75. Safeway Stores, 210 Md. at 175, 122 A.2d at 461. 
76. 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970). 
77. [d. at 654, 261 A.2d at 738; see also Fine v. Kolodny, 263 Md. 647, 651, 284 A.2d 
409,411 (1971) (stating that "[On any action for false imprisonment it is nec-
essary for the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was 
deprived of his liberty by another without his consent and without legal justifi-
cation"). 
78. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 Md. at 654, 261 A.2d at 738. 
594 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
equivalent to legal authority.79 Whether legal justification exists for 
the detention of another is ''judged by the principles applicable to 
the law of arrest. "80 In Maryland, there are different "laws of arrest" 
applicabk to private individuals, ~olice officers, and shopkeepers. 
a. Private Individuals 
In Paul, the authority of a private individual to arrest another 
in Maryland was stated as follows: 
[A] private person has authority to arrest without a warrant 
only when a) there is a felony being committed in his pres-
ence or when a felony has in fact been committed whether 
or not in his presence, and the arrester has reasonable 
ground (probable cause) to believe the person he arrests 
has committed it; or b) a misdemeanor is being committed 
in the presence or view of the arrester which amounts to a 
breach of the peace.81 
Thus, a private individual will incur liability for false imprisonment 
if he arrests or detains another for a misdemeanor that does not 
amount to a breach of the peace, even if there was probable cause 
to do SO.82 In Paul, "breach of the peace" was defined as "disor-
derly, dangerous conduct disruptive of public peace."83 
There is one exception, however, to the general arrest rules for 
a private individual. Property owners may lawfully detain a person 
against his will if they believe that person has illegally taken their 
property, but only for the purpose of preventing theft or recaptur-
ing the property.84 However, if the person detained does not unlaw-
fully have any of the owner's property in his possession, the arrester 
is liable for false imprisonment.85 
A private individual will not ordinarily incur liability for false 
imprisonment by providing, in good faith, information to the 
proper authorities, even if the information is incorrect or mis-
79. See id. at 655, 261 A.2d at 738. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 655, 261 A.2d at 738-39 (citing Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 
5 MD. L. REv. 125, 155 (1941); 49 Op. Att'y. Gen. 11 (1964». 
82. See Great Atl. & pac. Tea Co., 256 Md. at 656, 261 A.2d at 739. 
83. Id. at 656, 261 A.2d at 739. The court commented that the crime of "shoplift-
ing" would normally not constitute a breach of the peace. See id. at 655-56, 
261 A.2d at 739. 
84: See id. at 656, 261 A.2d at 739. 
85. See id. 
1997] Montgomery Ward v. Wilson 595 
taken.86 However, a person who knowingly gives false information to 
a police officer may become liable for the warrantless false arrest.87 
Additionally, a private person may incur liability for false imprison-
ment by wrongfully detaining another while waiting for the police 
to arrive and make a formal arrest.88 
b. Police Officers 
A police officer has legal justification to make a warrantless ar-
rest where he has probable cause89 to believe that a felony has been 
committed or attempted, and that the person he arrested has com-
mitted or attempted to commit the felony.9o This rule applies 
whether or not the felony was committed or attempted in the po-
lice officer's presence or view.91 With regard to misdemeanors, how-
ever, a police officer may only make a warrantless arrest if the mis-
demeanor was committed in his presence or view and he reasonably 
believes the person committed the offense.92 
86. See Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 135, 316 A2d 837, 843 (1974), over-
ruled by Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 664 A2d 916 (1995). 
87. See PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 11, at 47 n.97 (4th ed. 1971). 
88. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 174, 122 A2d 457, 460 (1956). 
89. See supra notes 4244 and accompanying text. 
90. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B(c) (1996). 
91. See id. 
92. See id. § 594B(b). Prior to the enactment of section 594B, the common law in 
Maryland was that probable cause is not a defense to false imprisonment for a 
police officer's warrantless arrest in a non-felony offense. See Ashton v. Brown, 
339 Md. 70, 121, 660 A2d 447, 472 (1995). In Ashton, the court found uncon-
stitutionally vague a juvenile curfew ordinance, that held parents and the op-
erators of establishments liable for a misdemeanor offense if they knowingly 
permitted a juvenile to violate the curfew. See id. at 93, 660 A2d at 458. In dis-
cussing the legislative extension of a police officer's authority to make war-
rantless arrests in non-felony offenses, the court, in dicta, explained: 
[I]f a police officer inside the ... [establishment] had probable 
cause to believe that the curfew ordinance was being violated, and 
that the operator of the ... [establishment] was aware of the curfew 
violation, the police officer could have arrested the operator with 
lawful justification, even though the curfew ordinance was in fact 
invalid. 
[d. at 122, 660 A2d at 473. In Ashton, a problem arose when the police officers 
arrested the minors for violating the curfew but did not arrest the operator of 
the establishment. See id. at 123, 660 A2d at 473. Although the curfew ordi-
nance provided that a police officer should take a minor in violation of the 
ordinance into custody "as a child in need of supervision,» it did not make it 
a misdemeanor for minors to violate the ordinance. [d. Because the minors 
who violated the curfew ordinance did not commit a misdemeanor, section 
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A police officer is legally justified to make an arrest under a 
warrant that appears to be legal on its face, even though the war-
rant is actually improper.93 A police officer will also not be liable for 
false imprisonment where, acting on false information from a pri-
vate person that he believes to be true, he arrests another individual 
without a warrant.94 
c. Shopkeepers/Merchants 
Prior to the enactment of Section 5-307 of the Courts & Judi-
cial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland,95 a 
shopkeeper or merchant had no greater rights than a private per-
son to arrest or detain an individual without a warrant.96 Section 5-
307 allows a merchant to detain or cause the arrest of any person 
whom the merchant has probable cause to believe has committed a 
594B did not apply to the arrest of the minors and the "false imprisonment 
count would appear to be governed by traditional Maryland common law 
principles." Id. 
93. See Ashton, 339 Md. at 120, 660 A.2d at 472 (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 
437, 440, 298 A.2d 156, 159 (1972); Levin v. Uzubar, 65 Md. 341,4 A. 285, 289 
(1886); Campbell v. Webb, 11 Md. 471, 482 (1857». 
94. See Fowler V. Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment & Defamation, 15 
TEX. L. REv. 157, 163-64 (1937), quoted in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 
Md. 701, 722, 664 A.2d 916,926 (1995). A private person who knowingly gives 
false information to the police officer in this situation will incur liability for 
. false imprisonment. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
95. Section 5-307 provides: 
A merchant or an agent or employee of the merchant who detains or 
causes the arrest of any person shall not be held civilly liable for de-
tention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or false 
arrest of the person detained or arrested, whether the detention or 
arrest takes place by the merchant or by his agent or employee, if in 
detaining or in causing the arrest of the person, the merchant or the 
agent or employee of the merchant had, at the time of the detention 
or arrest, probable cause to believe that the person committed the 
crime of "theft," as prohibited by § 342 of Article 27 of the Code, of 
property of the merchant from the premises of the merchant. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-307 (1995). 
96. See Great Au. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655, 261 A.2d 731, 738 
(1970). In discussing the appellant's argument that the court should adopt the 
rule expressed in section 120A of the Second Restatement of Torts, granting a 
shopkeeper the privilege to detain a person suspected of theft in order to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts, Judge Digges commented: 
"Without being facetious we note that shoplifting may be regarded as the 
price merchants pay for the success of modern merchandising; goods allur-
ingly displayed to stimulate 'impulse buying' inevitably also stimulate 'impulse 
taking.' " Id. 
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theft on· the merchant's premises, without incurring liability for de-
tention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or false 
arrest.97 Probable cause is measured by the circumstances as they 
reasonably appeared to the merchant at the time of the arrest.98 If, 
however, it is later determined that probable cause did not in fact 
exist, the arrested or detained individual may recover damages from 
the merchant.99 
A merchant's failure to investigate the circumstances surround-
ing an alleged shoplifting incident may destroy probable cause 
where a proper investigation would have cleared away suspicious cir-
cumstances. 1OO In addition, if the suspected shoplifter provides an 
explanation for the occurrence prior to the arrest, the merchant 
has a duty to investigate the plausibility of the explanation before 
making an arrest. 101 
C. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are generally recoverable in both non-inten-
tional and ~ntentional tort actions,102 with the exception of wrongful 
death.103 In the seminal case of Owens-illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,l04 the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland explained that "punitive damages are 
97. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-307 (1996). 
98. See Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 451, 298 A.2d 156, 165 (1972). 
99. See id. 
100. See K-Mart Corp. v. Salmon, 76 Md. App. 568,579,547 A.2d 1069, 1074 (1988), 
overruled l7y Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
101. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 448, 340 A.2d 705, 
709 (1975). The court stated that a security guard, "[a]s a private prosecutor, 
did not have probable cause to arrest Keulemans until after he had investi-
gated Keulemans's explanation, and had found it without any basis in fact." 
[d. (citations omitted). 
102. See, e.g., Adams v. Coates, 331 Md. 1, 12, 626 A.2d 36, 4142 (1993) (breach of 
fiduciary duty, action for accounting); Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 
484, 514, 471 A.2d 297, 312 (1984) (abuse of process); Wedeman v. City Chev-
rolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 529-31, 366 A.2d 7, 11-13 (1976) (fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, torts arising out of contract); Keulemans, 275 Md. at 448, 340 A.2d at 
709-10 (false arrest, malicious prosecution); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 
267 Md. 149, 168-72, 297 A.2d 721, 731-34 (1972) (allowing punitive damages 
for negligent operation of motor vehicle and negligent entrustment actions), 
overruled l7y, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); 
Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, i56 Md. 643, 657, 261 A.2d 731, 73940 
(1970) (false imprisonment); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 
Md. App. 97, 110-18, 412 A.2d 407, 416-20 (1980) (products liability). 
103. See Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md. App. 83, 99-102, 460 A.2d 1046, 1055 (1983). 
104. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
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awarded in an attempt to punish a defendant whose conduct is 
characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, or fraud, and to warn 
others contemplating similar conduct of the serious risk of mone-
tary liability. "105 
There are two requirements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to 
be entitled to an award of punitive damages. 106 First, there must be 
a compensatory award representing damages for the underlying 
claim.107 Second, punitive damages may not be recovered without 
proof of malice. 108 There has been much debate in the Maryland 
appellate courts in the last twenty-five years over the standard of 
conduct required to support an award of punitive damages. Prior to 
1972, "actual malice" was required to be proven by the plaintiff in 
order to be entitled to punitive damages. 109 In the 1972 case of 
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe CO.,110 the court of appeals for the first 
time allowed an award of punitive damages based on an implied 
malice standard, from a showing that the defendant was guilty of 
gross negligence. 111 Although the Smith court limited the application 
of the implied malice standard to motor vehicle torts, the standard 
was nonetheless applied judiciously to other non-intentional torts in 
later cases. 112 
105. [d. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650. In addition to punishing the defendant and deter-
ring others, several other purposes have been identified for imposing punitive 
damages: deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; preserving the 
peace; inducing private law enforcement; compensating victims for otherwise 
uncompensable losses; and paying the plaintiff'S attorney's fees. See Dorsey D. 
Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1,3 (1982). 
106. See Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 298 Md. 611, 626-27, 471 A.2d 735, 
743 (1984). 
107. See id. at 626, 471 A.2d at 743 (citing Montgomery Wards & Co. v. Keulemans, 
275 Md. 441, 446, 340 A.2d 705, 708 (1975». In addition to the requirement 
of an underlying compensatory damages award, in a case involving multiple 
claims, "[t]here must be a compensatory damages award foundation for each 
count of a complaint that provides a basis for punitive damages." Caldor v. 
Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 662, 625 A.2d 959, 973 (1993). 
108. Caldor, 330 Md. at 661, 625 A.2d at 973. 
109. See supra notes 34 and accompanying text. 
110. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled by, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 
325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
111. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 455, 601 A.2d 633,650 (1992). 
112. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986); Me-
dina v. Meilhammer, 62 Md. App. 239, 489 A.2d 35 (1985); American Laundry 
Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
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In addition to Smith, two other cases decided by the court of 
appeals changed the standard in assessing punitive damages. In 
1975, the court decided H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,113 a case that 
was clarified one year later in Wedeman v. City Chevrolet CO.114 Both 
cases involved torts "arising out of a contractual relationship."ll5 In 
formulating the Testerman-Wedeman rule, as it became known,116 the 
court sought to distinguish tortS that arise out of a contractual rela-
tionship from those that do not.1l7 The standard for assessing puni-
tive damage liability under this rule depended on whether the tor-
tious conduct took place before or after the contract's formation.ns 
If the tortious conduct occurred after the formation of the contract, 
then punitive damages could only be awarded with a showing of ac-
tual malice. 119 However, if the tortious conduct occurred prior to 
the formation of the contract, and therefore did not "arise out of 
the contract," punitive damages were allowable upon a showing of 
implied malice. 120 
Attempting to get a handle on a "proliferation of claims for pu-
nitive damages in tort cases"121 and to provide consistency in the ap-
plication of a punitive damages standard,122 the court of appeals in 
1992 returned to an actual malice standard in non-intentional torts 
in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia. 123 In addition to requiring proof of 
113. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975). 
114. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976). 
115. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 528-29, 366 A.2d at 10-11; acrord Testerman, 275 Md. at 44, 
338 A.2d at 53. 
116. See Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 311-12, 587 A.2d 491, 498-99 (1991) (El-
dridge, j., concurring). 
117. See Wedeman, 278 Md. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11. 
118. See id. 
119. See Testerman, 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53. 
120. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 532, 366 A.2d at 13; accord Testerman, 275 Md. at 4647, 
338 A.2d at 54. 
121. Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, Inc., 325 Md. 420, 450, 601 A.2d 633,648 (1992). 
122. See id. at 450-60, 601 A.2d at 647-52. In discussing the effect of an inconsistent 
application of a punitive damages standard, the court explained, "[ t] he irra-
tional and inconsistent application of a punitive damages standard under-
mines the objective of deterrence because persons cannot predict, and thus 
choose to abstain from, the type of behavior that is sanctioned by a punitive 
damages award." Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650. 
123. See id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652. 
Therefore, we overrule Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. and its progeny 
.... In a non-intentional tort action, the trier of facts may not award 
punitive damages unless the plaintiff has established that the defend-
ant's conduct was characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill 
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actual malice in the defendant's conduct, Zenobia also requires that 
"in any tort case a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing 
evidence the basis for an award of punitive damages."124 The Zenobia 
court also expressly abandoned the Testerman-Wedeman rule for the 
purposes of determining the appropriate standard to apply in al- c 
lowing punitive damages. 125 Subsequent decisions of the court of ap-
peals have further limited the availability of punitive damages, by 
applying the principles set forth in Zenobia to intentional torts as 
well. 126 
1. Punitive Damages in Malicious Prosecution Actions 
Prior to 1972, Maryland courts generally only awarded punitive 
damages with a showing of actual malice. However, with malicious 
prosecution, the courts traditionally allowed punitive damages to be 
awarded based on an inference of malice arising from a lack of 
will, or fraud, i.e., "actual malice. H 
Id. 
124. Id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. In explaining the rationale for imposing a higher 
standard than mere preponderance of the evidence in assessing punitive dam-
ages, the court stated, "this heightened standard is appropriate in the assess-
ment of punitive damages because of their penal nature and potential for 
debilitating harm." Id. 
125. See id. at 451-55, 601 A.2d at 650. In addition to leading to irrational results 
and inconsistent applications, the court criticized the rationale behind the Tes-
terman-Wedeman rule. 
Because the Testerman-Wedeman distinction focuses on when the con-
duct occurred rather than on the nature of the conduct, it has no re-
lationship to the purposes of punitive damages. Furthermore, the 
" 'arising out of contractual relations' rule formulated in Testerman 
and Wedeman had no support in the Maryland cases relied on in the 
Testerman and Wedeman opinions." 
* * * * 
Consequently we abandon the "arising out of a contract" distinction 
"and return to the principles relating to punitive damages which had 
prevailed in this State for many, many years before Testerman." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The Zenobia court also established the standard for an award of punitive dam-
ages in a products liability case. In order to establish actual malice on the part 
of a defendant in a products liability case, "the plaintiff must prove (1) actual 
knowledge of the defect on the part of the defendant, and (2) the defend-
ant's conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from 
the defect. HId. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653. 
126. See, e.g., Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995); Alexan-
der & Alexander v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc., 336 Md. 635, 650 A.2d 
260 (1994); Adams v. Coates, 331 Md. 1,626 A.2d 36 (1993). 
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probable cause. In an early malicious prosecution case, Stansbury v. 
Fogle,127 the court upheld a punitive damages award based on a jury 
instruction directing the jury to infer malice on the part of the 
defendant from a lack of probable cause in instituting the proceed-
ings against the plaintiff. 128 In allowing the punitive damages award 
to stand, the court reasoned that in order for the jury to find the 
defendant liable for malicious prosecution, it was necessary for the 
jury to determine "[t]hat the defendant in instituting or causing 
the institution of the prosecution was actuated by malice."129 
Recent Maryland cases have followed the principle set forth in 
Stansbury. In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack,130 the court distinguished 
the tort of false imprisonment from malicious prosecution in re-
gards to the standard for allowing punitive damages. 131 Although ac-
tual malice must be shown to support a punitive damages award in 
a false imprisonment action,132 in malicious prosecution actions, 
"such a finding would be implicit in a verdict for the plaintiff, 
which would necessarily include a finding of malice."133 Although 
not specifically addressing the issue of punitive damages, the court 
in Exxon Corp. v. KellyI34 noted that in malicious prosecution actions, 
the element of malice need not be separately proved, but may be 
inferred from a lack of probable cause in instituting or continuing 
criminal proceedings against the accused. 135 Where malice is in-
ferred from a lack of probable cause, the court in Montgomery Ward 
127. 37 Md. 369 (1873). 
128. See id. at 382. 
129. Id. Similarly, in.McNamara v. Pabst, 137 Md. 468, 112 A. 812 (1921), the court 
upheld a punitive damage award based on a finding of malice inferred from a 
lack of probable cause, because "in suits for malicious prosecution ... 'the 
gravamen of the action is malice.' " Id. at 473, 112 A. at 813 (quoting Mertens 
v. Mueller, 119 Md. 525, 536, 87 A. 501, 505 (1913». 
130. 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1955). 
131. See id. at 176, 122 A.2d at 461. 
132. See id. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text for discussion of punitive 
damages in a false imprisonment action. 
133. Safeway Stores, 210 Md. at 176, 122 A.2d at 461. Judge Levine, in his dissenting 
opinion in First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 
228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978), cited Safeway Stores for the proposition that 
"[p]unitive damages may always be awarded whenever the defendant is ad-
judged guilty of malicious prosecution, ... on the theory that the malice nec-
essary to support an exemplary damage award is an element of the tort itself." 
Id. at 248, 389 A.2d at 369 (Levine, j., dissenting) (citations omitted) (empha-
sis added). 
134. 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978). 
135. See id. at 699-701, 381 A.2d at 1152-53. 
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& Co. v. Keulemans136 held that punitive damages may be 
recovered. 137 
2. Punitive Damages in False Imprisonment Actions 
Unlike malicious prosecution actions, punitive damages in false 
imprisonment cases have historically been allowed in Maryland only 
where actual malice has been shown. In Bemheimer Bros. v. Becker,138 
a false imprisonment and assault case, the court of appeals held 
that an award of punitive damages could be justified only with evi .. 
dence showing that the wrong was inflicted maliciously or wan-
tonly.139 In Heinze v. Murphy,14O the court of appeals explained that 
in order for punitive damages to be recovered for false imprison-
ment, "the evidence must show wanton, or malicious motive, and it 
must be actual and not constructive or implied."141 
In 1972, however, the requirement of actual malice to support 
an award of punitive damages in false imprisonment actions was 
questioned in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser. 142 Although not de-
ciding the issue, the court in Cliser suggested that the standard for 
allowing punitive damages in false imprisonment cases may have 
been changed by Section 551A of Article 27 of ·the Annotated Code 
of Maryland143 and that punitive damages may now be recoverable 
136. 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975). 
i37. See id. at 448, 340 A.2d at 709-10 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 
Md. 406,421, 298 A.2d 16, 25 (1972». Keulemans, an employee of Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., was accused of· shoplifting a pair of sunglasses. See id. at 444, 
340 A.2d at 707. He explained to the store security officer, Johnson, that he 
had previously purchased the sunglasses at a People's Drug Store in the same 
shopping center, but was nonetheless placed under arrest. See id. Keulemans 
was subsequently acquitted of shoplifting charges, with the help of testimony 
from an employee of People's Drug Store who recalled selling Keulemans a 
pair of sunglasses similar to the one he was accused of stealing. See id. The 
fact that Keulemans had been employed by Montgomery Ward & Co. for over 
eight years, and that Keulemans had given Johnson a plausible explanation 
for his possession of the sunglasses prior to the arrest, led the court to con-
clude that Johnson did not have probable cause to arrest Keulemans. See id. at 
448, 340 A.2d at 709 (citing Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31,41-
42, 128 A.2d 600, 605-06 (1957». 
138. 102 Md. 250, 62 A. 526 (1905). 
139. See id. at 256, 62 A. at 528 (citing Loan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 100 (1883». 
140. 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 9J7 (1942). 
141: Id. at 434, 24 A.2d at 923 (citations omitted). 
142. 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972). 
143. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 551A (1970) (repealed 1971). Former section 551A 
is now codified at section 5-307 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article o.f 
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without proof of actual malice. l44 Following Gliser, the Keulemans 
court concluded that "punitive damages may be recovered . . '. 
where malice may be implied from wantonness, or from want of proba-
ble cause in a case of false arrest." 145 . • 
Thus, it appeared that in both malicious prosecution and false 
arrest actions in Maryland, the malice required to support an award 
of punitive damages can be inferred from the want of probable· 
cause. However, this standard was changed by the court's decision 
in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson. l46 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
From August through October of 1987, Frances Wilson was em-
ployed as a sales associate with the Montgomery Ward store in Tem-
ple Hills, Maryland. 147 The loss prevention department received sev .. 
eral consumer complaints in August of 1987 concerning 
unauthorized credit charges that had appeared on their monthly 
statements. 148 As a result of an internal inquiry into the matter, Wil-
son became the focus of Montgomery Ward's investigationl49 and 
was subsequently arrested at the store, in front of customers and fe·l-
low employees. 150 '.'. 
Jeffrey Bresnahan, a Loss Prevention Manager, conducted the 
investigation for Montgomery Ward. 151 The evidence relied on by 
Montgomery Ward in their decision to press charges against Wilson 
consisted mainly of the testimony of two other employees, Sandra 
the Annotated Code of Maryland. See supra note 95. 
144. See Cliser, 267 Md. at 421, 298 A.2d at 25. 'In discussing the effect of section 
551A on the tort of false imprisonment, the court stated: 
It may well be that [section] 551A has added a new dimension to the 
tort of false imprisonment in requiring that want of probable cause 
be established. Since malice may be implied from a want of probable 
cause, ... it would now seem possible to recover punitive damages in 
a false arrest case without proof of actual malice. 
[d. (citations o'mitted). 
145. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 448, 340 A.2d 705, 709 
(1975) (emphasis added) (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 
406,421,298 A.2d 16,25 (1972». 
146. 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
147. See Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 539, 647 A.2d 1218, 
1220 (1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 
701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
148. See id. 
149. See Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 706, 664 A.2d 916, 918 (1995). 
150. See id. at 708, 664 A.2d at 919. 
151. See id. at 705.Q6, 664 A.2d at 918. 
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Fuller and Lisa Hoimes. I52 Fuller, who Bresnahan had established 
was operating the register in the women's clothing department 
when the unauthorized transactions were made, told Bresnahan that 
she had rung up credit charges for Wilson, even though Wilson had 
not produced a credit card. I53 Fuller had apparently on several occa-
sions charged purchases for Wilson from an account number that 
was handwritten on a piece of paper. I54 Wilson told Fuller that the 
account numbers were either her sister's or her cousin's.155 Accord-
ing to Fuller, Wilson told her that they could not get in trouble for 
the unauthorized transactions because the store would not be able 
to prove them. I56 The testimony from Lisa Holmes, who was inter-
viewed by a security assistant, corroborated Fuller's testimony. 
Holmes told the security assistant that she had once seen Wilson 
purchase merchandise from Fuller using a credit card number that 
was handwritten on a piece of white paper. I57 Holmes also heard 
Wilson explain that the credit card number was her cousin's.158 In 
addition, Holmes said that Wilson told her not to say anything 
about the transaction to anyone in the loss prevention department 
during the investigation. I59 
In addition to the statements made by Fuller and Holmes, Bres-
nahan checked personnel records and verified that Wilson had 
been working in the women's clothing department when the unau-
thorized transactions occurred. I60 Bresnahan also interviewed Wil-
son, whom he felt was uncooperative in the investigation. 161 Al-
though Bresnahan testified at trial that he wanted to investigate 
further before concluding that Wilson was responsible for the unau-
thorized credit charges, the store management decided there was 
enough evidence to press charges. I62 Bresnahan then presented an 
application for a statement of charges to a district court commis-
sioner in Prince George's County, who issued a warrant for Wilson's 
152. See id. at 706, 664 A.2d at 918. 
153. See id. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. at 707, 664 A.2d at 919. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. at 706, 664 A.2d at 919. 
161. See id. at 706-07, 664 A.2d at 919. 
162. See id. at 707, 664 A.2d at 919. 
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arrest. 163 In October of 1987, two Prince George's County police of-
ficers, accompanied by a store security guard, placed Wilson under 
arrest pursuant to a warrant. l64 The criminal case against Wilson was 
subsequently dismissed for reasons that are not reflected in the re-
cord. 165 Wilson then brought this action against Montgomery Ward 
and Bresnahan for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in 
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, seeking both com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 166 
Montgomery Ward moved for partial summary judgment with 
regard to the punitive damage request. 167 They relied on the recent 
decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,168 arguing that punitive 
damages could no longer be recovered in Maryland "absent clear 
and convincing evidence of tortious conduct characterized by actual 
malice."169 Because the plaintiff's complaint failed to state any facts 
which would amount to actual malice,170 Montgomery Ward argued 
that punitive damages were not recoverable as a matter of law. 171 
Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Montgomery Ward's 
motion. 172 
Prior to the trial, Montgomery Ward filed a motion in limine to 
preclude Wilson from claiming she was found "not guilty" in the 
criminal proceedings. 173 Montgomery Ward contended that the 
criminal charges were dismissed because several witnesses had failed 
to appear for a trial that had already been rescheduled three 
times. 174 The circuit court then limited evidence of the disposition 
of the criminal charges against Wilson to a statement that the 
163. See id. at 708, 664 A.2d at 919. 
164. See Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 540, 647 A.2d 1218, 
1220 (1994), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 
70l, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
165. See id. at 540, 647 A.2d at 1221. 
166. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 705, 664 A.2d at 918. 
167. See id. 
168. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
169. Wilson, 339 Md. at 705, 664 A.2d at 918. 
170. As explained in Zenobia, actual malice is "[c]haracterized by evil motive, intent 
to injure, fraud ... coupled with a deliberate disregard of the consequences." 
Owens-fllinois, Inc., 325 Md. at 480, 601 A.2d at 663 (Bell, J. concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
171. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 705, 664 A.2d at 918. 
172. See id. The opinion does not indicate the circuit court's reasoning for denying 
the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. See id. 
173. See id. at 708, 664 A.2d at 919. 
174. See id. at 708, 664 A.2d at 919-20. 
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charges had been dropped, a ruling acquiesced to by all parties. 175 
At the trial, the plaintiff attempted to show that Bresnahan's in-
vestigation into the unauthorized credit transactions was inade-
quate. 176 During cross-examination of Bresnahan, it was established 
that he had not compared Wilson's signature with the signatures on 
the unauthorized charge slips and that he failed to have the signa-
tures analyzed by a handwriting expert. 177 In addition, Bresnahan 
continued to suspect that Wilson, who was of "slight build," was re-
sponsible for the unauthorized purchases despite the fact that some 
of these purchases were for "full-figure" sweaters and a "maternity 
bra." 178 
Wilson's testimony at trial contradicted that of Fuller and 
Holmes. Wilson testified that she never made any credit purchases 
at the store, and specifically denied making any purchases while 
Fuller was at the register. 179 She also denied asking Fuller and 
Holmes not to cooperate with the investigation of the unauthorized 
transactions.180 
At the close of the plaintiff's case, Montgomery Ward moved 
for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the evidence 
showed probable cause for Wilson's arrest. 181 In addition, it argued 
that the plaintiff had failed to establish either a· claim of false im-
prisonment or malicious prosecution.182 The motion was denied by 
the circuit court. 183 At the close of all the evidence, Montgomery 
Ward renewed its motions, including its contention that punitive 
damages could not be recovered absent a showing of actual mal-
ice. 184 The circuit court denied this motion as well. 185 The court 
then instructed the jury as to the issues of false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution, and punitive damages. 186 The defendants only ob-
175. See id. at 708-09, 664 A.2d at 920. 
176. See id. at 707, 664 A.2d at 919. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 708, 664 A.2d at 919. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. at 709, 664 A.2d at 920. A merchant cannot be held liable for malicious 
prosecution or false imprisonment if, at the time of the arrest, the merchant 
had probable cause to believe that the person had committed the theft. See 
supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. at 709-10, 664 A.2d at 920. 
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jected to the circuit court's instruction that punitive damages could 
be awarded in a malicious prosecution action on the basis of im-
plied malice. 187 
Mter finding the defendants liable for both false imprisonment 
and malicious prosecution, the jury awarded compensatory damages 
in the amount of $15,000 and punitive damages in the amount of 
$45,000. 188 The defendants then filed a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict,189 for a new trial,l90 or for remittitur,191 argu-
ing the insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of liability, 
and that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of punitive 
damages. 192 The circuit court denied the motion and the defendants 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on the same 
grounds that were raised in the circuit court. 193 In affirming the 
judgment, the court of special appeals held that it was proper to 
submit the issue of lack of probable cause to the jury because of the 
conflicting testimony at trial. 194 The court also held that it was 
proper to submit the issue of malice to the jury, because it could be 
inferred from a lack of probable cause. 195 Finally, the court held 
that actual malice was not required for awarding punitive damages 
in an intentional tort case, and that "in a malicious prosecution or 
false arrest case, punitive damages may be recovered where malice 
may be implied from wantonness or from lack of probable cause."196 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to "review 
the rulings by the courts below concerning th~ torts of malicious 
prosecution and false imprisonment, as well as the requirements for 
the allowability of punitive damages in malicious prosecution and 
187. See id. at 711, 664 A.2d at 921. 
188. See id. at 712, 664 A.2d at 921. 
189. See MD. RULE 2-532. 
190. See id. 2-533. 
191. See Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 
A.2d 125 (1960) (holding that the practice of granting a new trial, sought by 
the defendant, unless the plaintiff remits a portion of the verdict which the 
trial court deems excessive does not usurp the jury's function and is not, for 
that reason, unconstitutional). 
192. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 712, 664 A.2d at 921. 
193. See id. 
194. See Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 545, 647 A.2d 1218, 
1223 (1994), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 
701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
195. See id. at 546, 647 A.2d at 1223. 
196. [d. at 549, 647 A.2d at 1225 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 
275 Md. 441, 448-49, 340 A.2d 705 (1975». 
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false imprisonment actions."197 The court, focusing on the jury in-
structions given by the trial court, first discussed whether there was 
sufficient evidence to allow the issue of malicious prosecution to be 
submitted to the jury.198 Tl~e court noted that because the defend-
ants acquiesced in the circuit court's ruling on the disposition of 
the criminal charges against Wilson, it did not preserve for appel-
late review the issue of the plaintiff's failure to establish a termina-
tion in her favor. 199 
The court next addre&sed the defendants' contention that the 
plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to prove both the element of 
lack of probable cause and the element of malice.2OO Although find-
ing error in the trial court's instructions to the jury on both is-
sues,201 the court ultimately affirmed the judgment of compensatory 
damages against the defen~ants for lack of an objection to the in-
structions.202 The trial court gave the jury a general definition of 
probable cause as the instruction for determining lack of probable 
cause, and the jury was then instructed to determine whether prob-
able cause existed to prosecute Wilson by applying the definition to 
the facts presented.203 The ,court concluded that the jury was "given 
too much authority to determine whether there had been probable 
cause."204 
In discussing the functions of judge and jury in determining 
whether a lack of probable cause has been established, the court 
quoted the traditional rule set forth in Boyd v. Cross:205 "As to the ex-
istence of the facts relied on to constitute the want of probable 
197. Wilson, 339 Md. at 705, 664 A.2d at 918. 
198. See id. at 714-16, 664 A.2d at 922-23. 
199. See id. at 714 n.3, 664 A.2d at 922 n.3. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of th~ necessary elements for a malicious prosecution 
case. 
200. See id. at 714-18, 664 A.2d at 922-24. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. at 716, 664 A.2d at 923. In its instruction to the jury, the trial court de-
fined probable cause as "the reasonable belief that the Plaintiff was guilty. 
That is, the facts and circumstances ~hich the Defendant knew, or should 
have known, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the Plaintiff had 
committed the offense." Id. at 710, 664 A.2d at 920. The trial court then in-
structed the jury that "failure to conduct an adequate investigation may de-
stroy the probable cause .... So that probable cause does not exist if a proper 
investigation could have cleared the accused." Id. 
204. Id. at 716, 664 A.2d at 923. 
205. 35 Md. 194 (1872). 
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cause, that is a question for the jury; but what will amount to the 
want of probable cause in any case, is a question of law for the 
court."206 The court then followed the reasoning of Judge Rodowsky 
in Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood,207 who explained that "it is ordinarily 
improper for a trial court to '[furnish] the jury with a legally cor-
rect definition of probable cause which the jury is then to apply to 
the facts as the jury finds them to be.' "208 In this situation, the 
court should "explain to the jury whether or not probable cause ex-
ists under the various factual scenarios which may be generated by 
the evidence."209 
Regarding the malice element of malicious prosecution, the 
court explained that malice may be inferred from a lack of proba-
ble cause, and therefore "a plaintiff who has generated sufficient ev-
idence of lack of probable cause to send the case to the jury is also 
entitled to have the jury consider the issue of malice. "210 However, 
the court also explained that the malice required for malicious 
prosecution "consists of a wrongful or improper motive in initiating 
legal proceedings against the plaintiff. "211 The court held that in 
malicious prosecution actions, "the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant committed the tort with some improper purpose or mo-
tive. Mere negligence in instituting unjustified criminal proceedings 
against the plaintiff cannot satisfy the 'malice' requirement."212 The 
court then concluded that the jury instruction regarding the malice 
element was improper, III that it alternatively defined malice in 
terms of recklessness.213 
206. Wilson, 339 Md. at 716,664 A.2d at 923 (quoting Boyd, 35 Md. at 197). 
207. 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984). 
208. Wilson, 339 Md. at 716, 664 A.2d at 923 (quoting Palmer Ford, Inc., 298 Md. at 
503, 471 A.2d at 307). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 717, 664 A.2d at 924. 
211. Id. at 718, 664 A.2d at 924. 
212. Id. at 719, 664 A.2d at 925. 
213. See id. at 720, 664 A.2d at 925. The trial court gave the following instruction to 
the jury concerning the malice element of malicious prosecution: "A person 
acts with malice if his primary purpose in starting a prosecution is other than 
bringing the offender to justice. If a prosecution was started without probable 
cause, you may find from that alone some evidence of malice." Id. at 710, 664 
A.2d at 920. The trial court then gave the following alternative instruction to 
the jury, that the court of appeals found improper: 
In a case like this, you can have implied ... malice. And what is 
that? The law considers that malice exists in the risk and danger that 
were known or should have been known at the time. The conduct 
was performed in such a way as to show it was . . . reckless and . . . 
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The next issue the court resolved was whether a person can be 
liable for wrongfully procuring the arrest of an individual pursuant 
to a facially valid warrant.214 Because this was an issue of first im-
pression in Maryland,215 the court relied mainly on the decisions of 
other jurisdictions that have settled this issue.216 In reversing the 
court of special appeals, the court held that the "tort of false im-
prisonment does not lie against an individual who wrongfully pro-
cures the plaintiff's arrest, where there was no detention prior to 
the issuance of an arrest warrant, and where the arrest is made by a 
dangerous .... 
[d. at 720, 664 A.2d at 925. 
214. See id. at 723-27, 664 A.2d at 927-28. 
215. See id. at 726, 664 A.2d at 928. 
216. In Burt v. Ferrese, 871 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1989), the plaintiff, Burt, owned a con-
struction company that was performing concrete work for the City of 
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. See id. at 15. One of Burt's employees, without 
Burt's knowledge or consent, used water from a city. fire hydrant to clean 
equipment, a violation of a city ordinance. See id. Upon learning of the inci-
dent, the city manager, Ferrese and Blizzard, the supervisor of the city water 
department, obtained a warrant for Burt's arrest and he was subsequently ar-
rested by two city police officers. See id. The charge against Burt was ultimately 
nolle prossed by the Delaware Department of Justice, and Burt proceeded to file 
suit against Ferrese for, inter alia, false arrest and detention. See id. Noting that 
the tort of false arrest and detention is also called false imprisonment, the 
court of appeals held that "[ w] hile defendants might well have committed the . 
tort of malicious prosecution, defendants are not subject to liability for the 
tort of false arrest and detention, as plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a war-
rant." [d. at 17. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals of New York in 
Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310 (N.Y 1975). Broughton, a visitor to a mobile 
home that was searched by police officers pursuant to a search warrant, was 
arrested when the officers discovered several pounds of marijuana on the 
premises. See id. at 312. Broughton was then indicted for criminal possession 
of a dangerous drug in the first degree. See id. The indictment was subse-
quently dismissed, after the evidence obtained was suppressed "on the ground 
that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient as a matter of law." [d. at 313. 
In a nonjury civil trial, Broughton was awarded damages for "lost wages, 
mental anguish, humiliation and anxiety." [d. In discussing the differences be-
tween the torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, the court of 
appeals explained that "[ w ] hen an unlawful arrest has been effected by a war-
rant an appropriate form of action is malicious prosecution." [d. at 314; see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 cmt. a (1965) (noting that an un-
lawful detention gives rise to a cause of action for false imprisonment, "except 
where the confinement was by arrest under a valid process issued by a court 
having jurisdiction") . 
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police officer executing a facially valid arrest warrant. "217 
In finding that the trial court improperly submitted the false 
imprisonment claim to the jury, the court noted that Wilson did 
not challenge the facial validity of the warrant issued by the Prince 
George's County District Court Commissioner.218 In addition, she 
did not claim that she was detained without her consent while be-
ing questioned during the investigation into the unauthorized 
credit transactions.219 Therefore, as a matter of law, the defendants 
were not liable for false imprisonment.22o 
The final issue addressed by the court was whether an award 
for punitive damages could be sustained based on a showing of im-
plied malice rather than actual malice. 221 Because the underlying 
compensatory award against the defendants was based on both false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the court addressed the 
issue of punitive damages with respect to each tort separately.222 
The court of appeals initially noted that because it held the de-
fendants were not liable for false imprisonment as a matter of law, 
false imprisonment could not be the basis for an award of punitive 
damages.223 Nonetheless, the court reviewed prior case law o~ this 
issue to explain how the court of special appeals erred in its reason-
ing. The court of special appeals followed the earlier decision of 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans-24 in upholding the jury award 
of punitive damages against the defendants.225 
In Keulemans, the court of appeals held that "punitive damages 
may be recovered where there is actual malice, or where malice may 
be implied from wantonness, or from want of probable cause in a 
case of false arrest, . . . or in a case of malicious prosecution. "226 
The Keulemans court had relied on dictum in Montgomery Ward & 
217. WiMan, 339 Md. at 726-27, 664 A.2d at 928. 
218. See id. at 727, 664 A.2d at 929. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. at 727-36, 664 A.2d at 929-33. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. at 729-30,664 A.2d at 930 ("[sJince an award of compensatory damages 
must underlie any award of punitive damages in Maryland, no punitive dam-
ages may be awarded in the present case based upon false imprisonment"). 
224. 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975). 
225. See Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 548-49, 647 A.2d 
1218, 1225 (1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 
Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
226. Keulemans, 275 Md. at 448-49, 340 A.2d at 709-10. 
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CO. V. Cliser227 suggesting that the legislation now codified at section 
5-307 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland228 may have changed the standard for an 
award of punitive damages in a false imprisonment case.229 Because 
malice may be implied from want of probable cause, ·the Cliser court 
concluded "it would now seem possible to recover punitive damages 
in a false arrest case without proof of actual malice. "230 
In reversing the court of special appeals, the court pointed out 
that until the dictum in Cliser, Maryland courts maintained that pu-
nitive damages in false imprisonment cases could only be recovered 
where actual malice was shown by evidence of "intent to injure, ill 
will or spite, evil motive, fraud, or knowing wrongdoing."231 The 
court then dismissed the suggestion from Cliser that section 5-307 
changed the standard for an award of punitive damages in a false 
imprisonment case: 
In our view, however, the dictum in the Cliser case was un-
fortunate and was unsupported by the language or purpose 
of § 5-307 . . .. The statute was. obviously designed to offer 
an additional protection to merchants and their employees 
under certain circumstances, rather than to make it easier. 
for plaintiffs to recover damages. Nothing in the statutory 
language suggests a purpose of making it easier for plain-
tiffs to recover punitive damages in false imprisonment 
actions.232 
Thus, the court concluded that punitive damages are only recover-
able with a showing of actual malice in false imprisonment 
actions.233 
Although punitive damage awards have historically been denied 
in Maryland absent a showing of actual malice in false imprison-
ment cases, punitive damages have traditionally been recoverable in 
227. 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972). 
228. MD. CODE ANN .. CTS & JUD. PRoc. § 5-307 (1995). 
229. See Cliser, 267 Md. at 421, 298 A2d at 25. 
230. Id. 
231. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 730, 664 A2d 916, 930 (1995) (cit-
ing D.C. Transit Sys. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 583-84, 287 A2d 251, 254 (1972); 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 657, 261 A.2d 731, 739-40 
(1970); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610,617,56 A2d 813, 816-17 
(1948); Fleisher v. Ensminger, 140 Md. 604, 609, 620, 118 A. 153, 155, 159 
(1922». 
232. Wilson, 339 Md. at 730-31, 664 A2d at 931. 
233. See id. at 732, 664 A2d at 931. 
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malicious prosecution cases on the basis that malice may be in-
ferred from a lack of probable cause for the prosecution of the ac-
tion. 234 The court explained, however, that recent decisions have 
"clarified and modified the standards for the allowability of punitive 
damages in tort cases. "235 An award of punitive damages must gener-
ally be based upon actual malice in both intentional and non-
intentional torts.236 These recent decisions have reflected the "tradi-
tional policy and purpose of punitive damages in Maryland, which 
have been 'articulated in our cases for over a century.' "237 
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,238 the court explained that 
"[p]unitive damages are awarded in an attempt to punish a defend-
ant whose conduct is characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, 
or fraud, and to warn others contemplating similar conduct of the 
serious risk of monetary liability."239 Because of the "penal nature" 
of punitive damages, the Zenobia court also required the use of a 
clear and convincing standard of proof in the assessment of puni-
tive damages in any tort case. 240 
In modifying the common law with respect to the standard for 
an award of punitive damages in a malicious prosecution case, the 
court concluded that permitting a wrongful motive to be inferred 
from a lack of probable cause is inconsistent with the clear and con-
234. See itl. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text for a history of punitive 
damages in malicious prosecution actions in Maryland. 
235. Wilson, 339 Md. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932. In recent decisions, the court of ap-
peals has continued to expand the scope of Zenobia with respect to the allowa-
bility of punitive damages, and thus has greatly narrowed the circumstances 
that would support an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Ellerin v. Fairfax 
Savings, 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995) (holding that actual malice must 
be shown in order to support an award of punitive damages in action for 
fraud or deceit); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., 
Inc., 336 Md. 635, 650 A.2d 260 (1994) (holding actual malice required to be 
shown to support an award of punitive damages in action for wrongful inter-
ference with contract or economic relations); Komomick v. Sparks, 331 Md. 
720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (holding intoxicated driver did not act with actual 
malice when he negligently caused an automobile accident, and thus punitive 
damages were not available). 
236. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932. 
237. [d. (quoting Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. 216, 227, 652 A.2d 1117, 1122 
(1995». 
238. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
239. [d. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650, quoted in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. at 
733, 664 A.2d at 932. 
240. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. 
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vincing standard of proof expressed in Zenobia. 241 In addition, al-
lowing punitive damages on a basis of such implied malice does not 
conform to the recent decisions of the court of appeals that limit 
punitive damages to cases "where there exists heinous conduct, 
characterized by fraud, ill will, spite, evil motive, conscious wrongdo-
ing, or intent to injure. "242 Thus, the court stated the change in the 
law in Maryland with respect to an award of punitive damages in a 
malicious prosecution action as follows: 
Henceforth, for punitive damages to be allowable in mali-
cious prosecution actions, a plaintiff must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence the defendant's wrongful or im-
proper motive for instigating the prosecution. Although the 
jury may draw an inference of such motive from lack of 
probable cause for purposes of compensatory damages, it 
may not rely on the inference in considering punitive 
damages.243 
In applying this standard to the present case, the court found no 
evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendants to support 
an award of punitive damages, and thus reversed the circuit court's 
award of punitive damages.244 
IV. ANALYSIS 
With its decision in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland clarified Maryland law with respect to the torts of 
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, addressed an issue 
of first impression in the area of false imprisonment, and drove the 
final nail into the coffin of the "implied malice" standard as a basis 
for an award of punitive damages in any tort action. Indeed, the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the Wilson case, including the 
241. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 735, 664 A.2d at 933. 
242. [d. 
243. [d. at 735-36, 664 A.2d at 933. 
244. See id. at 736, 664 A.2d at 933. The court noted that the plaintiff's theory of 
the case, that Bresnahan had performed an inadequate investigation prior to 
initiating the criminal proceedings against her, is consistent with a finding 
that the proceedings were negligently, rather than maliciously, brought 
against the plaintiff. See id. In addition, there was no evidence contradicting 
Bresnahan's testimony that he received information from two witnesses that 
Wilson had made unauthorized credit transactions. See id. Thus, "there was in-
sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Bresnahan 
acted from a wrongful motive when he initiated Wilson's criminal prosecu-
tion." [d. 
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events at trial, permitted the court to address a broad range of is-
sues and substantially impact the way malicious prosecution and 
false imprisonment actions are handled in Maryland. 
Throughout its analysis of this case, the court goes to great 
lengths to identify and examine the errors made by both the trial 
court and defense counsel. Many of the "errors" found by the court 
arguably were not subject to judicial review, in" that they were not 
properly preserved for appeal. Nonetheless, the net effect of the 
court's in-depth analysis was not only to state the law as it exists in 
Maryland, but to provide guidance to courts and practitioners in 
handling malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases. In 
addition, because of the additional safeguards provided by the Wil-
son court to future defendants, it will now be much more difficult 
for plaintiffs to prevail in malicious prosecution and false imprison-
ment actions in Maryland. 
A. Malicious Prosecution 
The court's analysis of the tort of malicious prosecution fo-
cused on the last two elements outlined in Exxon Corp. v. Kelly,245 
i.e., absence of probable cause for the proceeding and "malice," or 
a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of 
bringing an offender to justice.246 The first two elements, a criminal 
proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the 
plaintiff and termination of the proceeding in favor of the ac-
cused,247 were not discussed by the court. 
It is now clear that in malicious prosecution actions in Mary-
land, the role of the jury is more limited than in other civil actions 
in general, and the role of the court is correspondingly en-
hanced.248 Where the facts are undisputed, the question of probable 
cause is one entirely for the court to determine. However, where 
the facts are disputed, the jury must determine the "existence of 
the facts relied on to constitute the want of probable cause. "249 Al-
though the jury retains its role as fact-finder, the court's function is 
to determine what amounts to a lack of probable cause.250 At trial, 
the court instructs the jury as to whether or not probable cause ex-
245. 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978). 
246. See supra notes 41-75 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 1640 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text. 
249. Wilson, 339 Md. at 715-16, 664 A.2d at 923 (quoting Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 194, 
197 (1872». 
250. See id. 
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ists under different hypothetical situations.251 It is, therefore, "ordi-
narily improper for a trial court to '[furnish] the jury with a legally 
correct definition of probable cause which the jury is then to apply 
to the facts as the jury finds them to be.' "252 
This restriction of the function of the jury in a malicious prose-
cution action, a view followed by the majority of jurisdictions,253 ben-
efits defendants. By removing from the jury the question of whether 
probable cause exists, the trial judge, who is schooled in the law, 
can better apply the appropriate legal principles and standards of 
probable cause to the facts of a case. Having the trial judge make 
this determination safeguards defendants from inconsistent or un-
sound jury verdicts that may be motivated by sympathy for the 
plaintiff, a misplaced desire to punish the particular defendant in 
the case, or simply a difficulty in distinguishing between the ques-
tion of the plaintiff's innocence and the defendant's civil liability. 
A few jurisdictions retain the traditional role of the civil jury in 
malicious prosecution actions, allowing the question of want of 
probable cause to be determined by the jury.254 As justification for 
allowing juries to determine whether probable cause existed at the 
initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina stated in Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. CO.,255 
that the true rule was to allow juries to determine the question of 
probable cause, which is consistent with the rule in negligence cases 
concerning mixed questions of law and fact.256 Considering the gen-
erally unfavorable attitude of courts toward malicious prosecution 
actions, however, the rule expressed in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 
which removes the question of whether probable cause exists from 
the hands of the jury into the more able hands of judges, would ap-
pear to be the better rule.257 Moreover, the rule restricting the func-
tion of the jury in malicious prosecution actions furthers the public 
policy of encouraging citizens to bring to justice those who are ap-
251. See id. 
252. Id. (quoting Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 503, 471 A.2d 297, 307 
(1984». 
253. Annotation, Probable Cause or Want Thereof, in Malicious Prosecution Action, as 
Q;testion of Law for Court or of Fact for Jury, 87 A.L.R. 2d 183, 189 (1963). 
254. See id. at 20()'()2 (citing Edgington v. Glassmeyer, 168 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1959); 
Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 172 S.E. 870 (S.C. 1934». 
255. 172 S.E. 870 (S.C. 1934). 
256. See id. at 872-73 (citing Caldwell v. Bennett, 22 S.C. 1 (1884». 
257. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. 
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parently guilty of committing a crime,258 by safeguarding the rights 
of the civil defendant from an unrestrict.ed jury. 
In addition to clarifying the respective roles of judge and jury 
in a malicious prosecution action, the court appeared to disagree 
with the plaintiff's theory that Bresnahan lacked probable cause to 
initiate proceedings against Wilson because he failed to perform an 
adequate investigation. The court firs~ commented on the trial 
court's jury instruction that "probable cause does not exist if a 
proper investigation could have cleared the accused," coupled with 
the defendant's failure to ask the court to rule that their investiga-
tion was reasonably complete as a matter of law.259 Although the 
court did not conclude that the instruction was improper, the court 
did suggest that the facts revealed by the trial testimony may well 
have established probable cause as a matter of law. The court ac-
knowledged that Wilson's testimony did contradict the testimony of 
Bresnahan, Fuller, and Holmes with regard to Wilson's actions. 26o 
However, her testimony did not directly contradict the testimony 
that Bresnahan had been told by both Fuller and Holmes that Wil-
son had made unauthorized credit card charges.261 Thus, Wilson's 
testimony did not go directly to the issue of whether Bresnahan rea-
sonably believed that Wilson had committed a theft at the time he ini-
tiated criminal proceedings. If Bresnahan's belief that Wilson had 
committed a crime was in fact reasonable, the existence of probable 
cause could be established and would serve to defeat Wilson's claim 
of malicious prosecution.262 The court then summarized Wilson's ar-
gument, apparently accepted by the trial court and not objected to 
by the defendants, as follows: "Thus, under the plaintiff's theory of 
the case, regardless of the inculpatory information which Bresnahan had re-
ceived about Wilson, questions about the reasonableness of the subse-
quent investigation might still justify a finding of lack of probable 
cause. "263 
Although the court made no further comment as to the plain-
tiff's theory of the case, it may be inferred from the testimony at 
trial that probable cause may have been established as a matter of 
law. Because probable cause is measured by the circumstances as 
they reasonably appeared to the defendant at the time proceedings 
258. See supra note 12. 
259. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 715-16, 664 A.2d 916, 923 (1995). 
260. See id. at 715, 664 A.2d at 923. . 
261. See id. 
262. See supra notes 4244 and accompanying text. 
263. Wil5on, 339 Md. at 715, 664 A.2d at 923 (emphasis added). 
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are initiated against the accused,264 and it was uncontradicted that 
Bresnahan was told of Wilson's alleged unauthorized credit card 
charges,265 it would appear that the trial court could have found the 
existence of probable cause as a matter of law. 
Regarding the element of malice, the court restated the well-
recognized principle that malice in this context may be inferred 
from a lack of probable cause.266 In addition, malice in this form 
does not require evidence of spite, hatred, or revenge.267 However, 
the court clarified the standard for satisfying the malice element in 
a malicious prosecution action, where it is inferred from a lack of 
probable cause. Mere negligence or "reckless" conduct in institut-
ing criminal proceedings will not satisfy the malice element.268 In or-
der to satisfy the malice element, there must be proof that the 
defendant initiated the criminal proceedings with some improper 
purpose or motive.269 The requirement that there be proof of an 
improper purpose or motive on the part of the defendant works to 
the defendant's advantage. Now, a plaintiff in a malicious prosecu-
tion action will have to show the defendant's state of mind at the 
time of the initiation of the proceedings, rather than mere negli-
gence. Moreover, the requirement of proof of defendant's improper 
purpose or motive in instituting criminal proceedings is based on 
sound legal principles, followed by virtually all jurisdictions.27o The 
strict requirement that the plaintiff must prove the malice element 
of a malicious prosecution action271 furthers the public policy of en-
264. See Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 451, 298 A.2d 156, 165 (1972) (emphasis ad-
ded). 
265. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 715, 664 A.2d at 923. 
266. See id. at 717,664 A.2d at 924 ("[I]n early cases, as well as more recent ones, 
this Court has taken the position that the 'malice' element of malicious prose-
cution may be inferred from a lack of probable cause.") (citations omitted). 
267. See id. at 719, 664 A.2d at 925. 
268. See id. The court found the jury was given an improper instruction that alter-
natively defined malice in terms of recklessness. See id. 
269. See id. 
270. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS § 28:1, at 6-7 (1990) 
("Attempts to pursue tort claims or causes of action on a theory of 'negligent 
prosecution' have turned out to be unsuccessful."). 
271. See Boose v. City of Rochester, 421 N.YS.2d 740 (N.Y App. Div. 1979). In dis-
cussing the merits of the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim that was based 
on an inadequate investigation by the police department, the court stated that 
the plaintiff's "right to be free of ... unjustified and unreasonable litigation is 
limited by the obvious policy of the law to encourage proceedings against 
those who are apparently guilty of criminal conduct and to let finished litiga-
tion remain undisturbed and unchallenged." [d. at 744. The court then held 
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couraging citizens to aid in the prosecution of criminals without 
fear of civil liability. 272 
B. False Imprisonment 
In reaching its holding on the false imprisonment issue, the 
court differentiated between the torts of false imprisonment and 
malicious prosecution. "False imprisonment is the invasion of the 
interest in freedom from unlawful confinement, while a malicious 
prosecution is the unlawful use of legal procedure to bring about a 
legal confinement. "273 Relying on out-of~state and secondary author-
ity, the court concluded that an individual who wrongfully procures 
the arrest of another is not liable for false imprisonment where 
there was no detention prior to the issuance of the warrant and 
where the arrest is made by a police officer pursuant to a facially 
valid arrest warrant.274 
In dicta, the court also made several other observations. Al-
though an individual who wrongfully procures the arrest of another 
can insulate himself from liability for false imprisonment by comply-
ing with the formal requirements of the law, he may become liable 
for malicious prosecution if the necessary elements of malicious 
prosecution are satisfied.275 In addition, wrongfully procuring a war-
rantless arrest does not insulate the wrongdoer from liability for 
false imprisonment.276 Finally, in the absence of malice, the court 
indicated that an action for ordinary negligence might lie against 
an individual who negligently procures a warrant for the arrest of 
another. 277 . 
Thus, in order to pursue a claim for liability against a third 
party who wrongfully procures an arrest by properly swearing out a 
warrant, the issue is one of proper pleadings. That is, the plaintiff 
must simply file a malicious prosecution action, rather than an ac-
tion for false imprisonment. Although this is the correct course of 
that the plaintiff's cause of action, sounding in negligence, could not be main-
tained. See id. "[P] laintiff's recovery must be determined by established rules 
defining . . . malicious prosecution, rules which permit damages only under 
circumstances in which the law regards the . . . prosecution as improper and 
unjustified.» [d. 
272. See supra note 12. 
273. Wilson, 339 Md. at 723-24, 664 A.2d at 927 (quoting HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, 
THE LAw OF TORTS § 3.9 at 297 (2d ed. 1986». 
274. See id. at 726-27, 664 A.2d at 928. 
275. See id. at 725, 664 A.2d at 928. 
276. See id. at 723, 664 A.2d at 927. 
277. See id. at 727, 664 A.2d at 929. 
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action for the plaintiff to pursue, there are different considerations 
inherent in the two separate torts that stem from the different ele-
ments needed to satisfy each cause of action.278 It may, for example, 
be more difficult to prove a case of malicious prosecution than false 
imprisonment for two important reasons. First, a plaintiff in a mali-
cious prosecution action must show a lack of probable cause on the 
, part of the defendant in instituting the criminal proceedings.279 As a 
corollary to this element, the defendant can defeat the plaintiff's 
case by establishing the existence of probable cause at the time 
criminal proceedings were initiated.280 In a false imprisonment ac-
tion, however, lack of probable cause is not a necessary element, 
and the existence of probable cause is not a defense.281 Second, the 
element of malice required to sustain a malicious prosecution ac-
tion need not be shown in a false imprisonment action.282 . There-
fore, with the court's decision in Wilson, it is now more difficult for 
a plaintiff to prevail on a tort claim against an individual who 
wrongfully procures an arrest by using the proper legal mechanisms 
in doing so. This difficulty occurs because the defendant is shielded 
from liability for false imprisonment and the plaintiff must prove 
the more difficult elements of malicious prosecution in order to 
prevail. 
In addition to following the proper procedures in swearing out 
a warrant, a private prosecutor can further insulate himself from lia-
bility when attempting to bring criminal proceedings against an-
other. Prior to obtaining an arrest warrant, the private prosecutor 
could consult with an attorney, and thereby insulate himself from li-
ability for malicious prosecution. If all facts are disclosed to the at-
torney, the reliance upon the advice of counsel in obtaining a war-
rant or instituting criminal proceedings would be a strong defense 
to a malicious prosecution action.283 The combination of truthfully 
consulting with an attorney and then obtaining a warrant through 
the proper legal channels would make it extremely difficult for the 
plaintiff to prevail on any liability theory. 
278. See supra notes 15, 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements 
of each cause of action. 
279. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
281. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 15, 77 and accompanying text. 
283. See Gladding Chevrolet v. Fowler, Inc., 264 Md. 499, 509, 287 A.2d 280, 286 
(1972); see alsQ supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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The Wilson court's decision regarding the issue of false impris-
onment clearly benefits future defendants because it provides a safe-
guard to the private citizen who utilizes the proper procedures in 
swearing out a warrant to effectuate an arrest against an alleged 
wrongdoer. In accord with the overwhelming weight of authority,284 
this decision is important for two main reasons. First, by providing a 
safeguard to the citizen who swears out a warrant against an individ-
ual suspected of committing a criminal offense, citizens are en-
couraged to use the proper mechanisms of the law to insulate 
themselves from personal liability. This, in turn, fosters more con-
trol of the criminal justice system by the courts and law enforce-
ment officers. Presumably, the magistrate responsible for issuing an 
arrest warrant is better able than the average citizen to determine 
whether probable cause exists, assuming the private prosecutor 
truthfully discloses all of the pertinent facts of the alleged crime. In 
addition, a volatile and dangerous situation may arise where an un-
trained private citizen attempts to make a "citizen's arrest." Second, 
the public policy of encouraging citizens to bring to justice individ-
uals suspected of committing crimes285 is furthered by safeguarding 
the citizen who tries to do so. Provided there was no improper pur-
pose or motive on the part of the private prosecutor in procuring 
the arrest of an individual,286 no tort liability will attach where there 
was no detention prior to the issuance of the warrant and when the 
arrest is made by a police officer pursuant to a facially valid arrest 
warrant. 287 
C. Punitive Damages 
In addressing the punitive damages issue for both false impris-
onment and malicious prosecution, the court followed the recent 
Maryland trend of limiting punitive damages in all tort actions.288 
Regard~ng false imprisonment, the court asserted that the law in 
284. See, e.g., Bulkley v. Klein, 23 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962); Mullen v. 
Brown, 138 Mass. 114 (1884); Thomas v. M.R.A., 713 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 
1986); Genito v. Rabinowitz, 225 A.2d 590 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1966); Kaye v. Shane, 
118 N.YS.2d 592 (1953); James v. Southwestern Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 408 (Okla. 
1960); Erp v. Carroll, 438 So. 2d 31 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Tredway v. Birks, 
242 N.W. 590 (S.D. 1932). See generally REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 45 A 
cmt. b (1965). 
285. See supra note 12. 
286. See supra notes 266-71 for discussion of the malice element of the tort of mali-
cious prosecution. 
287. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
622 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
Maryland law has always been .that punitive damages could only be 
recovered where the tort was committed with actual malice.289 Ex-
plaining how the law bc::came muddled, the court cited the "unfor-
tunate "290 dicta in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser,291 which stated 
that punitive damages may now be available in a false imprisonment 
action without proof of actual malice. 292 This dicta was later fol-
lowed in Montgomery Wanl & Co. v. Keulemans,293 which further con-
tributedto the inconsistency in the law.294 However, the court 
pointed out that the punitive damages award in Keulemans was 
based on malicious prosecution, and not on false imprisonment.295 
Thus, the court concluded that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has never held, in a false imprisonment case, that punitive damages 
could be awarded without a showing of actual malice.296 Although 
this appears to be a technical distinction, given the language in 
j(eulemans, the result follows the court's recent stance on the issue 
of punitive damages.297 
A few courts have accepted the same reasoning as did the court 
in Keulemans, that a showing of want of probable cause in an action 
for false imprisonment warrants an inference of malice sufficient to 
permit a recovery of punitive damages.298 None of these cases, how-
ever, offer a justification for this rule. In false imprisonment actions, 
there does not appear to be a clear majority rule concerning the 
appropriate standard necessary to support an award of punitive 
damages. Depending on the jurisdiction, the legal standards suffi-
cient to permit an award of punitive damages range from: an infer-
ence of malice as a result of want of probable cause, as in 
Keulemans;299 to an inference of malice as a result of a disregard of, 
or indifference to, another's rights;3°O an inference of malice as a re-
289. See Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 730-32, 664 A.2d 916, 930-31 
(1995). 
290. See supra notes 227-29. 
291. 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972). 
292. See id. at 421, 298 A.2d at 25. 
293. 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975). 
294. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 731, 664 A.2d at 931. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. at 731-32, 664 A.2d at 931. 
297. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. 
298. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Davis, 94 So. 754 (Ala. 1922); Farish v. Smoot, 58 
So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1952); Melton v. LaCalamito, 282 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. App. 1981); 
Jackson v. Thompson, 188 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App. 1945). 
299. See supra notes 136-38. 
300. See, e.g., Birmingham Ledger Co. v. Buchanan, 65 So. 667 (Ala. 1914); Wrains 
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suit of the particular circumstances of each case;301 actual malice, 
"in the sense of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, evil or 
wrongful motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud," as in Wilson;302 
to other states of mind, such as willful,303 wanton,304 reckless,305 or 
intentionaP06 conduct. The importance of the court's decision in 
Wilson, with regard to the availability of punitive damages in false 
imprisonment actions, is not the particular standard it chose for the 
allowability of punitive damages. Rather, the importance is that the 
court articulated a standard that is consistent with its decisions con-
cerning punitive damages since the seminal case of Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. v. Zenobia. 307 Although restricting the availability of punitive 
damages in false imprisonment actions clearly benefits future de-
fendants, it is arguable that everyone benefits from consistency in 
the law because justice is administered fairly. 
The court could not rely on a close scrutiny of the language in 
prior decisions, as it did in addressing the issue of punitive damages 
in false imprisonment actions, to reach its holding that punitive 
damages are only recoverable in malicious prosecution actions with 
a showing of actual malice. The court was unable to do so because 
it had been well-settled in Maryland that implied malice could form 
the basis of a punitive damages award in malicious prosecution ac-
tions.30g Instead,. the court accepted the defendants' argument that 
the recent decisions of the court of appeals have clarified and mod-
ified the standards used in assessing punitive damages in tort ac-
tions.309 Thus, allowing an award of punitive damages to be based 
v. Rose, 175 So.2d 75 (Fla. App. 1965); Garvis v. K-Mart Discount Store, 461 
S.W.2d 317 (Mo. App. 1970); Kolzem v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R. Co., 20 
N.YS. 700 (1892). 
301. See, e.g., Hammargren v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 241 P.2d 1192 (Kan. 1952); 
Jackson v. Thompson, 188 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App. 1945); Vandermeer v. Pacific 
Northwest Dev. Corp., 545 P.2d 868 (Or. 1976). 
302. F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 1973). 
303. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hoard, 340 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. App. 1960). 
304. See, e.g., Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla. App. 1965); Doyle v. Douglas, 390 
P.2d 871 (Okla. 1964); McAleer v. Good, 65 A. 934 (Pa. 1907). 
305. See, e.g., Shelton v. Barry, 66 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. App. 1946); Guion v. Associated 
Dry Goods Corp., 374 N.E.2d 364 (N.Y App. Div. 1977); Skillern & Sons, Inc. 
v. Stewart, 379 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
306. See, e.g., Garvis v. K-Mart Discount Store, 461 S.W.2d 317 (Mo. App. 1970); Big 
Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newmank, 461 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
307. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). See supra notes 121-26 for a discussion of 
Zenobia. 
308. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. 
309. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 733, 664 A.2d 916, 932-33 (1995). 
624 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
on implied malice is inconsistent with the recent decisions that have 
explained the policies and purposes of punitive damages in Mary-
land, namely to punish the wrongdoer and deter others.310 
Again, as is the case with the issue of false imprisonment, the 
court has provided consistency to Maryland law in the area of puni-
tive damages by applying the actual malice standard expressed in 7£-
nobia311 to malicious prosecution actions. As a practical matter, it 
would not make sense to have one standard for assessing punitive 
damages in the majority of causes of actions, and a lesser standard 
for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment cases. In addition, 
by restricting the availability of punitive damages to plaintiffs, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has embodied the general views of 
the Maryland legislature, which has also recently limited the 
amount of damages available to plaintiffs by enacting a statutory cap 
on non-economic damages in tort actions.312 
Although not mentioned by the Wil50n court, its decision con-
cerning punitive damages in malicious prosecution actions clears up 
another inconsistency in Maryland common law. Maryland courts 
have long recognized that malicious prosecution actions are gener-
ally disfavored by the law, because public policy encourages the ex-
posure of criminal activity.313 However, punitive damages had tradi-
tionally been available in Maryland in malicious prosecution actions 
based on a lower standard than in other torts,314 a practice that is in-
consistent with public policy. Therefore, the public policy of encour-
aging private citizens to prosecute criminals is furthered by requir-
ing clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to support an 
award of punitive damages in a malicious prosecution action. 
Clearly, restricting the availability of punitive damages in malicious 
prosecution actions benefits future defendants, and provides an ad-
ditional safeguard to the private citizen who wishes to utilize the 
public court system to bring an alleged criminal offender to justice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, the court of appeals was 
presented with an opportunity to clarify Maryland law as it applied 
to the torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. In 
310. See id. 
311. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text. 
312. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 11-308 (1995). 
313. See supra note 12. 
314. See supra notes 127-38. 
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holding that an individual who wrongfully procures the arrest of an-
other is not liable for false imprisonment, where there was no de-
tention prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant and where the ar-
rest is made by a police officer executing a facially valid arrest 
warrant,315 the court has provided citizens in Maryland who attempt. 
to prosecute criminal offenders a substantial amount of insulation 
from liability.316 The prudent citizen will seek the advice of an attor-
ney prior to swearing out an arrest warrant, and thus insulate him-
self even further from any liability.317 
Furthermore, the court was able to make a strong statement 
concerning punitive damages in Maryland. There can no longer be 
any question, after overturning a century old common-law princi-
ple,318 that actual malice is the standard to be used for considering 
an award of punitive damages in any tort. 
Joseph R SalJlO 
315. See Wilson, 339 Md. at 725-26, 664 A.2d at 928. 
316. See supra notes 248-312 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra notes 53, 283 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. 
